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The "Income First"
Rule: The Blumer
Case
By James Jaeger
James A Jaeger J.D. is a partner with
the Madison, Wisconsin Law Firm
of Hill, Glowacki, Jaeger &
Hughes, LLP. He is a 1975 gradu-
ate of Georgetown University
Law School and holds a Masters
of Law in Taxation from Temple
University. His practice focuses on
elder law, estate planning, pro-
bate, tax, and small business mat-
ters. He is a member of the Elder
Law Section of the State Bar of
Wisconsin (Chair 1995-1996) and
National Academy of Elder Law
Attorneys. He is the current Chair
of the State Bar's Legal Assistance
Committee and a former chair of
the Electronic Bar Services
Committee. He is a member of
the Electronic Publishing Working
Group of the State Bar, a frequent
speaker on elder law and estate
planning topics, and an instructor
in Elder Law at the University of
Wisconsin Law School.
urnett and Irene
Blumer had a problem.
In 1994, Irene had
been admitted to a
nursing home while
Burnett remained in the commu-
nity. At the time of admission,
the couple had $145,644 of sav-
ings and investments-hardly a
princely sum. However, Irene's
nursing home care probably was
costing $3,500 to $4,000 per
month.
Finally, in December of 1996,
when their savings and invest-
ments had dwindled to $89,335,
Burnett applied for Medical
Assistance on Irene's behalf. At
the time of application, Burnett's
monthly Social Security and
Pension income was $1,324. The
income from the "standard"
community spouse resource
allowance (CSRA), $72,822, was
$315 per month. 1 Irene had a
total monthly Social Security and
Pension income of $1,263.
The application for Medical
Assistance was denied on the
grounds that the Blumer's assets
exceeded the total that they were
entitled to keep-$74,822
($72,822 for Burnett and $2,000
for Irene).
The Fair Hearing
The Blumers requested a fair
hearing and appealed the denial
of Medical Assistance, arguing
that under Sec. 49.455(8)(d), Wis.
STATs., Burnett was entitled to
retain additional assets to bring
his monthly income up to the
Monthly Minimum Maintenance
Needs Allowance (MMMNA)
which was $1,727 in 1996. At the
fair hearing, they argued that even
if Burnett retained all the addi-
tional assets over and above the
CSRA, the additional assets
would only generate another $63
of income, still leaving him below
the MMMNA. The hearing
examiner denied the Blumer's
appeal on the grounds that the
applicable Wisconsin Statute, Sec.
49.455(8)(d), required that before
a community spouse is entitled to
retain additional assets he/she
must first take the maximum pos-
sible income allocation from the
institutionalized spouse. This is
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the so-called "income first"
rule. The hearing examiner held
that this decision was compelled
by the words of the Wisconsin
Statute.
The Blumers appealed to the
Circuit Court for Green County,
which upheld the decision of the
hearing examiner. The Blumers
then appealed to the Wisconsin
Court of Appeals.
Court of Appeals Decision
On June 8, 2000, the
Wisconsin Court of Appeals
reversed the decision of the
Circuit Court. 2 On appeal, the
Blumers argued that while they
agreed that the Wisconsin
statute in question mandated
use of the income first rule, the
income first rule itself was
invalid since it was contrary to
governing federal law.
To understand the basis for
the Court of Appeals decision in
Blumer, it is necessary to com-
pare the federal and the state
statutes relating to an increase
in the CSRA. The "normal"
CSRA is an amount equal to
one-half of the couple's counta-
ble resources as of the date of
institutionalization, with a floor
of $50,000 and a ceiling that
varies from year to year (in
1996 the ceiling was $72,822).3
However, the maximum can be
raised by a hearing examiner
after a fair hearing. The Federal
statute, 42 U.S.C. 51396r-
5(e)(2)(C) states as follows:
Revision of community
spouse resource allowance.
If either such spouse estab-
lishes that the community
spouse resource allowance
(in relation to the amount
of income generated by
such an allowance) is inad-
equate to raise the commu-
nity spouse's income to the
minimum monthly mainte-
nance needs allowance,
there shall be substituted,
for the community spouse
resource allowance under
subsection (f)(2) of this
section, an amount ade-
quate to provide such a
minimum monthly mainte-
nance needs allowance.
The comparable provision of
the Wisconsin statutes is found
at S49.455(8)(d) and reads as
follows:
If either spouse establishes
at a fair hearing that the
community spouse resource
allowance determined
under subsection (6)(b)
without a fair hearing does
not generate enough income
to raise the community
spouse's income to the min-
imum monthly maintenance
needs allowance under sub-
section (4)(c), the depart-
ment shall establish an
amount to be used under
subsection (6)(b)3 that
results in a community
spouse resource allowance
that generates enough
income to raise the commu-
nity spouse's income to the
minimum monthly mainte-
nance needs allowance
under subsection (4)(c).
Except in exceptional cases
which would result in
financial duress for the
community spouse, the
department may not estab-
lish an amount to be used
under subsection (6)(b)3
unless the institutionalized
spouse makes available to
the community spouse the
maximum monthly income
allowance permitted under
subsection (4)(b) or, if the
institutionalized spouse
does not have sufficient
income to make available
to the community spouse
the maximum monthly
income allowance permit-
ted under subsection
(4)(b), unless the institu-
tionalized spouse makes all
of his or her income ...
available to the community
spouse .... (emphasis added)
The italicized material is the
portion of the statute that cre-
ates the "income first" rule in
Wisconsin. The Blumers argued,
and the Court of Appeals held
that the italicized portion of the
Wisconsin statute is invalid
because it is inconsistent with
federal law.
The Blumers argued that the
federal statute is unambiguous
and that there is nothing in its
language to justify the "income
first" gloss applied by the sec-
ond portion of the Wisconsin
statute. The state argued that
the federal statute is ambiguous
and therefore it would be per-
missible to resort to the legisla-
tive history of the statute as well
as administrative interpretations
by the Health Care Financing
Administration (HCFA-now
the Center for Medicare
Medicaid Services, or CMS) to
support Wisconsin's use of the
"income first rule."
The Court of Appeals reject-
ed the State's claim that the
statute is ambiguous on three
grounds:
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The non Wisconsin cases
relied on by the State
"reveal[] that the courts
have stated their conclu-
sions in broad strokes,
such as opining that the
spousal impoverishment
provisions are complex;
and therefore, it is impossi-
ble to attach a plain mean-
ing to any provision. While
we may agree that these
provisions are complex, we
cannot agree that every
provision is ambiguous
simply because of the com-
plexity of the statute as a
whole."4
The state also urged that
the phrase "community
spouse's income" in 42
U.S.C. 51396r-5(e)(2)(C) is
ambiguous and could rea-
sonably be interpreted to
mean not only the income
in the name of the commu-
nity spouse but also
income in the name of the
institutionalized spouse
that is available for alloca-
tion. The Court of Appeals
rejected this argument as
well. It pointed out that the
income allocation from the
institutionalized spouse to
the community spouse is
made only after eligibility
is determined. Thus,
Congress could not have
meant to include the insti-
tutionalized spouse's
income in determining
whether the community
spouse had enough income
to satisfy the MMMNA
for eligibility purposes if
the income allocation did
not take place until after
eligibility was determined.
If Congress had wanted to
include both the income of
the institutionalized spouse
and the community spouse,
it could have said so-and
it didn't.5
The "resource first" rule
(meaning that the increase
in the CSRA is determined
without taking into
account the institutional-
ized spouse's income) is
consistent with the policy
of the spousal impoverish-
ment provisions since that
rule makes provision for
the often inevitable deple-
tion of the community
spouse's income at the
death of the institutional-
ized spouse, especially
when the institutionalized
spouse has the larger
income which may not
continue to the same
extent after the death of
the institutionalized
spouse. "Congress knew
that to take all of the com-
munity spouse's assets to
pay for the institutional-
ized spouse's nursing home
care would be short-sight-
ed, because the community
spouse would need to turn
to other public assistance
programs to survive once
the institutionalized spouse
died. And, reliance on pub-
lic assistance by the com-
munity spouse had been a
result of spousal impover-
ishment, which the MCCA
sought to change." 6
The State petitioned for
review by the Wisconsin
Supreme Court, which declined.
It then petitioned the U.S.
Supreme Court for a writ of cer-
tiorari, which was granted.7
The United States
Supreme Court Decision
The United States Supreme
Court in a 6-to-3 vote reversed
the decision of the Wisconsin
Court of Appeals and held that
while the federal law did not
mandate the resource first rule
(as urged by the Blumers), it
permitted use of the income first
rule by individual states, and
that Wisconsin permissibly
adopted the income first rule.
The majority opinion was writ-
ten by Justice Ginsburg, joined
by Justices Rehnquist, Thomas,
Souter, Breyer, and Kennedy.
Justice Stevens wrote a dissent,
in which Justices O'Connor and
Scalia joined.
The decision in the Supreme
Court turned on interpretation
of the phrase "community
spouse's income." It defined the
issue as follows:
The question presented is
whether the income-first
prescription of the
Wisconsin statute, requir-
ing that potential income
transfers from the institu-
tionalized spouse be con-
sidered part of the "com-
munity spouse's income"
for purposes of determin-
ing whether a higher CSRA
is necessary, conflicts with
the MCCA. The answer to
that question, the parties
agree, turns on whether the
word "community spouse's
income" in 51396r-
5(e)(2)(C) may be inter-
preted to include potential,
post-eligibility transfers of
income from the institu-
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tionalized spouse permit-
ted by 51396r-5(d)(1)(B). 8
The Blumers had contended
that the phrase "community
spouse's income" meant the
income in the name of the com-
munity spouse at the time of
application, i.e. before eligibil-
ity had been determined. The
Supreme Court disagreed. It
first turned to the nuances of
English grammar to support its
rejection of the Blumers' argu-
ments:
Congress' use of the pos-
sessive case does not
demand construction of
"community spouse's
income" to mean only
income actually possessed
by, rather than available or
attributable to, the com-
munity spouse; to the con-
trary, the use of the posses-
sive is often indeterminate.
See J. Taylor, Possessives in
English: An Exploration in
Cognitive Grammar 2
(1996) ("[Tjhe entity
denoted by a possessor
nominal does not necessar-
ily possess (in the everyday,
legalistic sense of the term)
the entity denoted by the
possessee."); see also
Smiley v. Citibank (South
Dakota), N. A., 517 U.S.
735, 739 (1996) (question-
ing characterization of a
statutory term as unam-
biguous when its meaning
has generated a division of
opinion in the lower
courts).9
The Court then turned its
attention to the Blumers' claim
that the interpretation of DHFS
was inconsistent with the struc-
ture of the statute as a whole. 10
In accord with the
Secretary, we do not agree
that Congress circum-
scribed the (e)(2)(C) [fair]
hearing in the manner
Blumer urges. Although
that hearing is conducted
pre-eligibility, its purpose is
to anticipate the post-eligi-
bility financial situation of
the couple. The procedure
seeks to project what the
community spouse's
income will be when the
institutionalized spouse
becomes eligible. See Tr. of
Oral Arg. 14 (officer con-
ducting (e)(2)(C) hearing
makes a calculation that
"concerns the post-eligibili-
ty period"; question is will
"the at-home spouse ...
have sufficient income in
the post-eligibility period,
or does the resource
allowance need to be
jacked up in order to pro-
vide that additional
income"). The hearing offi-
cer must measure that pro-
jected income against the
MMMNA, a standard that,
like the CSMIA, is opera-
tive only post-eligibility.
S51396r-5(b)(2), (d)(3). 11
Note that the Court did not
state that the income first rule
was required by federal law, or
that the resource first approach
was precluded. Rather, it held
that states were free, consistent
with the concept of "coopera-
tive federalism," to experiment
with different approaches under
the Medicaid statute, such as
the ability to use either "income
first" or "resources first." 12 The
Blumers had argued that
resources first was mandated by
federal statute (and that was
really the only approach they
could take under the circum-
stances of this case).
Writing in dissent, Justice
John Paul Stevens was not
impressed with the reasoning of
the majority:
There are two possible
bases for arguing that the
Wisconsin statute is consis-
tent with S1396r-(e)(2)(C):
first, that despite the
express limitation in
S1396r-5(d) to deductions
authorized "[a]fter an
institutionalized spouse is
determined or re-deter-
mined to be eligible,"
Congress really meant
"before or after"; and sec-
ond, that when Congress
used the term "community
spouse's income" in
§51396r-5(e)(2)(C), it real-
ly meant "community
spouse's income plus any
deduction from the institu-
tionalized spouse's income
that may in the future be
made available to him." As
is clear, both of these argu-
ments require altering the
plain text of the statute.
Rather than admitting that
its reading strains the text
of the MCCA, the Court
engages in an analytical
sleight of hand: It con-
ceives of the transfer of
income that is commanded
by the Wisconsin statute as
a condition of eligibility,
not as a required transfer,
but only as a prediction of
things to come. Ante, at 16
("In short, if the 551396r-
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5(e)(2)(C) hearing is prop-
erly comprehended as a
pre-eligibility projection of
the couple's post-eligibility
situation, as we think it is,
we do not count it unrea-
sonable for a state to
include in its estimation of
the 'community spouse's
income' in that post-eligi-
bility period an income
transfer that will then
occur"). The Court's tem-
poral manipulation of the
SS1396r-5(e)(2)(C) hear-
ing is innovative; but it is
wrong for at least three
reasons.13
In summary, these reasons are
as follows:
* The majority's interpretation
(creating a theoretical predic-
tion of post eligibility income) is
inconsistent with the Wisconsin
Statute which requires that the
community spouse "makes
available" income requires the
pre eligibility transfer of
income, which requirement is
prohibited by MCCA. 14
* The institutionalized spouse is
not required by federal law to
transfer income to the commu-
nity spouse, but is only permit-
ted to do so. In fact, the transfer
may not occur (I had such a case
where a guardian for an institu-
tionalized spouse would not
permit the transfer because of a
dispute with the community
spouse). Thus the "predicted"
transfer of income may never
take place.15
* The position of the majority
violates the Medicaid "name on
the check" rule since only
income in the name of a partic-
ular spouse is determined to be
the income of that spouse. 16
Finally, while the majority
chose to pay "respectful consid-
eration" to certain opinions of
the Federal Secretary of Health
and Human Services, the dissent
suggested that those pronounce-
ments should be given little
weight:
The Secretary has taken
inconsistent positions on
this issue over time, see
App. to Pet. for Cert. 78a-
90a, and the current opin-
ion letter offers no analysis
of the potentially conflict-
ing provisions in the federal
and state statutes. It is
devoid of any "'power to
persuade."' 7
Public Policy Consideration
Not Considered
Neither the majority nor the dis-
sent really addressed the public
policy implications of adopting
the "income first" rule rather
than the "resources first" rule.
The State Bar of Wisconsin Elder
Law Section Amicus Briefl 8
offered a rationale as to why the
resource first rule is preferable to
the income first rule for many
community spouses.
Posit the following situation:
Husband is in the nursing home.
He has Social Security of $1,000
per month and a pension of
$750 (which is a joint and fifty
percent survivor annuity-the
standard under the Retirement
Equity Act). Wife has Social
Security of $500 and no pen-
sion. The couple has $200,000
of assets.
Under the resource first rule,
wife will probably be able to keep
all of the $200,000, since at a five
percent rate of return (a generous
assumption in today's interest rate
environment) it would generate
only $833 per month of income,
so that even with all of the assets
her income would not equal the
MMMNA (which is $1,990 this
year). She would also get $657 of
the husband's income to bring her
up to the MMMNA. At her hus-
band's death, she would have
$1,000 of Social Security, $375 of
pension income, and $833 of
interest income for a total of
$2,208, which could probably
just about sustain her in an assist-
ed living setting, with some use of
principal from the investment.
If the income first rule is
applied, she will have to spend
down the $200,000 to $89,280
(which will generate $372 per
month of income). During her
husband's lifetime, she would
get $1,118 from his income to
bring her up to the
MMMNA. 19 However, at the
husband's death, her income
would be $1,000 of Social
Security, $375 of pension
income and only $372 of invest-
ment income for a total of
$1,747. Thus, she is $461 worse
off at her husband's death, yet
her monthly expenses in the
community will not have
decreased (and possibly may
increase as she becomes older
and has more health problems).
Will the state be any better
off? In the first scenario
(resource first) the husband con-
tributes $657 per month to the
wife's care, while in the income
first scenario, he contributes
$1,118, a difference of $461 per
month that has to be made up by
Medicaid while the husband is in
the nursing home.
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Furthermore, the wife will
probably go on Medicaid sooner
or will have to enter a nursing
home because she doesn't have
the assets to pay for care in a less
costly setting. The state will argue
that the application for husband's
medical assistance will be
delayed, but that assumption may
also be flawed. Income first may
very well encourage couples to
divest earlier, even before nursing
home care is a possibility, to pre-
serve some assets for the family.
Thus, all that may happen is that
inadvisable divestment will take
place and the husband will go on
Medical Assistance at the same
time he would have under the
resource first scenario.
Where Are We Now?
Even with the Supreme Court
Blumer decision, the issues sur-
rounding increasing the CSRA
will continue in cases where the
combined income of the couple
is less than the MMMNA (cur-
rently $1,990 to $2,283). This
means that the issues that have
arisen with the Department
while Blumer was pending in
the U.S. Supreme Court will
continue to be pertinent.
The primary issue in this
regard is the question of "non
income producing assets." In a
pair of "secretary reviewed" Fair
Hearing Decisions-MRA-
70/15380; MRA 05/35807-the
Division of Hearings and
Appeals, held that if a couple had
more than $2,000 of "non
income producing" assets, they
were not entitled to an increase
in the CSRA. 20 A review of the
pertinent statutes, Sec.
49.455(8)(d), Wis. STATS. and 42
U.S.C. 1396r-5(e)(2)(C) does not
show any legislative or regulato-
ry basis for this argument.
Nonetheless, the Department has
persisted in its position.
The Department has found
there to be an issue of "non
income producing" assets in a
number of situations:
* Life Insurance Cash Value 21 In
these cases, the Hearing
Examiner relied on a misreading
of the POMS.22 While the POMS
treats dividends on life insurance
policies as not being income,
interest earned on the dividends is
so treated. Since cash value is
made up of accumulated divi-
dends and interest, and since
additional earnings are based on
the entire cash value, even under
the Department's reasoning Life
Insurance Cash Value is income
producing. Note that in a case
where the applicant presented
evidence of how the cash value
was computed, an increase was
allowed.23
* Dividend and Interest
Reinvestment from Stocks and
Bonds24
* Annuity Not in Pay Status25
Showing that they are not
always consistent, in this case
the Department treated an
annuity contract not in pay sta-
tus, as an income-producing
asset because it was generating a
"reasonable rate of return."
* Income Not Paid Monthly2 6
In this case, dealing with life
insurance cash value, the poli-
cies paid dividends which could
have been paid out on a month-
ly basis, but were not. The
Department held that the appli-
cant was not entitled to an
increase in the CSRA.
The Dane County Circuit
Court has provided a partial
answer to the "non income pro-
ducing asset" dilemma. 27 In
Rung, the Court held that an
applicant must be given reason-
able opportunity to convert non
income producing assets into
income producing assets, before
the increase in the CSRA can be
denied. Thus, for example, if you
have life insurance with more
than $2,000 of cash value,28 you
could take a policy loan for the
cash value and put it in a savings
account; or, if you have the
option, have the dividends on the
policy paid monthly.
If you are caught in a situa-
tion where there has been a
denial of the CSRA increase due
to this rule, I would recommend
an appeal to the Circuit Court
challenging the underlying posi-
tion of the Department since it
seems to be totally baseless.
Conclusion
The Supreme Court's decision in
Blumer was unfortunate-and
in the long run, may cost the
states more rather than less.
How this works out in practice
remains to be seen.
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